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Is the Radical Critique of Merit
Anti-Semitic?
Daniel A. Farbert
Suzanna ShenyT
Conventional concepts of merit are under attack by some Critical
Legal Scholars, CriticalRace Theorists, and radicalfeminists. These critics contend that "merit" is only a social construct designed to maintain the
power of dominant groups. This Article challenges the reductionist view
that merit has no meaning except as a toolfor those in power to perpetuate
the existing social order. The authors observe that certain traditionally
oppressedgroups, most notably Jews and Asian Americans, are disproportionately represented in some desirable economic and educational positions. They have in that sense "succeeded" beyond the supposedly
dominant majority. The economic and educational accomplishments of
these groupsare hard to reconcilewith the notion that "merit" exists solely
to perpetuate thepower of the dominant majority (white Gentiles). Because
the radical critique of merit denies that the accomplishments of these
minority groups can be explained by genuine merit, it necessarily implies
that these groups have obtained an unfair proportion of desirable social
goods. Therefore, the authorssuggest, the radicalcritique of merit has the
wholly unintended consequence of being anti-Semitic and possibly racist.
The Article concludes that the radical critique equates merit with raw
power and approaches moral relativism. The authors call for continued
scrutiny and improvement (ratherthan wholesale repudiation) of current
conceptions of merit.
The anti-Semite is not too anxious to possess individual merit.
Merit has to be sought, just like truth; it is discovered with difficulty; one must deserve it. Once acquired, it is perpetually in question: a false step, an error, and it flies away. Without respite, from
the beginning of our lives to the end, we are responsible for what
merit we enjoy. Now the anti-Semite flees responsibility as he flees
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his own consciousness, and choosing for his personality the permanence of rock, he chooses for his morality a scale of petrified
values.'
INTRODUCTION

Several years ago, the Duke Law Journal published a remarkable
exchange over the validity of societal standards of merit. Duncan Kennedy,
one of the founders of Critical Legal Studies, opened the debate. In support
of affirmative action in law school faculty hiring, Kennedy attacked
existing standards of merit as socially constructed and impossible to apply
in a colorblind fashion.2 In response, Judge Richard Posner, a leading pragmatist and pioneer in Law and Economics, criticized Kennedy's affirmative
action proposal and implicitly defended merit standards.3 Posner, in turn,
was labeled a racist by Jerome Culp, a prominent advocate of Critical Race
Theory. Culp accused Posner of exercising the "majority voice, attempting
to silence black voices."4 Posner's fatal flaw was his failure to acknowledge that "facially objective and disinterested standards in fact serve the
interests of the white majority,"' and therefore are not truly objective at all.
As we will see, a similar position on merit is taken by other leading critical
theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon.6 This essay will suggest the existence of deeply troubling links between the logic of this position and historic
forms of racial and religious discrimination.
More than the evaluation of the merit of legal scholarship is at stake in
this debate. Although the debate about merit was sparked by a disagreement over the narrower question of law school hiring, the critique of merit
is tied to fundamental philosophical issues. As critical scholar Gary Peller
has pointed out, the critique of merit stems from philosophical attacks on
the concepts of objectivity and knowledge currently employed in our society.7 For example, Catharine MacKinnon disavows "standard scientific
1. JEAN-PAun. SmaRR, ANm-SEmrrE Am Jaw 27 (George J. Becker trans., 1948).
2. Duncan Kennedy, A CulturalPluralistCasefor Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990
DuKE L.J. 705 [hereinafter Kennedy, CulturalPluralist]. For example, he states that we can only rank
articles "within a particular genre" and that "[the vast majority of recognizable genres ... have a

specifically white, ideologically moderate or conservative history... built into their rules." Id. at 754.
This article has been republished in his recent book, DuNcAN KENNEDY, SEXY DansINo ETc. 34 (1993)
[hereinafter KmENEDY, SExY DR.ssNGo]. Except as otherwise noted, all citations are to the Duke article.
3. Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1157.
4. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White Authority in

the Legal Academy, 41 Dutn LJ. 1095, 1097 (1992). The accusation of racism is explicit. See, e.g., id.
at 1101 (Posner "is racist while claiming to be a neutral observer of racial circumstances"). See also id.
at 1113 (comparing Posner with "white slaveowners in the antebellum South who were kind to their

slaves").
5. Id. at 1097.
6. We will use "critical theory" as a blanket term including radical feminism, Critical Legal
Studies, and Critical Race Theory. We recognize that not every member of these groups adheres to the
positions criticized in this essay.
7. Gary Peller, The Discourseof ConstitutionalDegradation, 81 GEo. L.J. 313, 339 (1992).
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norms" because the radical feminist critique of "the objective standpoint as
male" is necessarily "a critique of science as a specifically male approach to
knowledge."8
Similar attacks have been mounted on traditional moral concepts such
as fairness and justice. According to Richard Delgado, a leading critical
race theorist, "[n]ormative orderings always reflect the views of the powerful" and therefore serve to stifle social change. 9 Consequently, the "game"
of normative discussion is "rigged against" the oppressed, for "one cannot
use categories like justice, equality, etc., to overturn the very system" that
created those values. 0 Normative talk, Delgado suggests, merely masks
the operation of the "Home Office," which "does not speak normativese at
all, but a sharper, brusquer, unfamiliar language full of consonants and
commands."'" Thus, like "merit," existing concepts of truth and morality
are seen as part and parcel of systems of oppression.
We will refer to this stance as "radical constructivism," since it views
these fundamental concepts as socially constructed aspects of systems of
power. This viewpoint should be contrasted with more moderate forms of
social constructivism, such as the view that categories defining social
groups (such as homosexuals) are socially constructed. These moderate
views do not challenge our entire structure of thought and are not the subject of this discussion.' 2 The position taken by Delgado, MacKinnon, and
Culp (and to some extent by Kennedy) cuts considerably deeper to the bone
of existing conceptual schemes. These broad philosophical implications
8. CATHAuNE A. MAcKmNoN, FEmINISM UNMODwnmn: DISCOURSES ON LwE AND LAW 54
(1987). As she explains: "Objectivity is the epistemological stance of which objectification is the social
process .... That is, to look at the world objectively is to objectify it." Id. at 50. For a discussion of
this mode of feminist epistemology, see Martha Nussbaum, Feminists and Philosophy, N.Y. REv. oF
Booxs, Oct. 20, 1994, at 59. For further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 6366.
9. Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward A Critique of Normativity in Legal
Thought 139 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 951 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Norms and Normal Science].
10. Idl at 961.
11. l at 962. Similarly, Pierre Schlag, a critical legal scholar, points out the role of values as
merely strategic methods to advance other goals in advertising, and argues that the same is true in law:
It would be useful, then, to begin understanding value-talk in American legal thought as a
mode of advertising-advertising for the institutions, devices, and techniques of "law." One
would then understand that "values" are related to these institutions, devices, and techniques
of law in the same ambiguous ways as in any other kind of commercial advertising. From this
perspective, the project ofparticipating in legal thought to advance moral or political "values"
would be on the same order (and just as promising) as trying to advance moral or political
values by securing employment with an advertising firm. In short, it would be a category
mistake-a particularly profound category mistake.
Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 219, 227 (1994). For a critique of the Delgado/Schlag
attack on normativity, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Casefor Reasoned Commitment, 6
YAI J.L. & HuMAN. 197 (1994).
12. This more moderate form of constructivism is associated with legal scholars such as William
Eskridge and Martha Minow. See MARTHA Mmnow, MAKMI ALL ma D EENcE: INCLUSION,
ExCLUsioN, Aim AMmUcAN LAW (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L.
Rav. 607 (1994).
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prompt us to write about a topic that, considered narrowly, might seem to
involve only an intramural dispute over academic standards.
The views of radical constructivists have not gone unopposed.
Pragmatists such as Posner argue that current conceptions of objectivity,
knowledge, and merit may be flawed but are necessary starting points in
analysis. As he puts it, "[t]hose who believe that 'reality' is constructed
rather than found are prone to forget that not every social construction is
arbitrary."' 3 Although anti-dogmatic and refusing to accept even the most
entrenched beliefs as final truths, 4 pragmatism also has a common sense
vein that keeps it from veering into radical constructivism and utopianism. 15
While open to uses of metaphor, rhetoric, and even imaginative but false
ideas in advancing inquiry, pragmatists do not abandon conventional values
of truth and merit:
But to acknowledge that mistakes, emotive utterances, and literal falsehoods (which may be imaginative or emotional "truths")
can have social utility is not to deny that truth and falsity can and
ordinarily must be distinguished. It is not to endorse sloppy or tendentious scholarship, an "anything goes" attitude toward claims and
assertions, or, what is closely related, the belief that, like everything
else, science and mathematics are "just rhetoric."' 6
The pragmatist, then, "recognizes the importance of logic and clear thinking," and does not embrace "epistemological or moral skepticism, or scien' 7
tific or moral relativism.'
We join this debate in support of Posner's position, but we do so only
indirectly, by arguing that the logical implications of radical constructivism
are disturbingly anti-Semitic.'" In a sense, our argument might itself be
considered an exercise in Critical Race Theory, since it assesses a viewpoint (radical constructivism) from the perspective of a historically
oppressed group.
In a nutshell, our argument is as follows. Radical constructivists contend that standards of merit are socially constructed to maintain the power
of dominant groups.' 9 In other words, "merit" has no meaning, except as a
way for those in power to perpetuate the existing hierarchy. In explaining
13. RicHARD A. PosmR, OvEcomn o LAW 291 (1995).
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 295.
16. Id. at 10.

17. Id.
18.

Posner does remark in passing that Kennedy's comments about "'the possibility that the

assimilated person is "neither fish nor fowl" '" is insensitive to Jews. Posner, supra note 3, at 1158
(quoting Kennedy, CulturalPluralist,supra note 2, at 741). Kennedy removed that comment when the
article was republished in his book. Compare Kennedy, CulturalPluralist,supra note 2, at 741 with
KENNEDY, SExy DR.ssiNo, supra note 2, at 66. In a recent book, Posner also comments briefly on antiSemitism in the Afrocentrist movement. PosN , supra note 13, at 377-80.
19. On social constructivism generally, see Eskridge, supra note 12; Susan H. Williams, Feminist
Legal Epistemology, 8 BaiucmEY WoMEN's L.L 63, 64-75 (1993). For a critique of how radical
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why some minorities have been less successful than whites, these writers
repudiate genuine merit as even a partial explanation of the current distribution of social goods. They are then left in a quandary, unable to explain the
success of other minority groups that have actually surpassed the dominant
majority. If the accomplishments of these "model minorities"--Jews,
Japanese Americans, and Chinese Americans-cannot be justified as
reflecting the merit of their endeavors, then some other explanation must be
sought. Unfortunately, once merit is put aside, no explanation for competitive success can be anything but negative. These groups have obtained disproportionate shares of important social goods; if they have not earned their
shares fairly on the merits, then they must have done so unjustly. Thus, the
radical constructivist view of merit logically carries negative implications
regarding groups that have surpassed the dominant majority-in particular,
Jews, the group that is our primary focus.
Although radical constructivists are surely as appalled by antiSemitism as by racism, we contend that negative stereotypes about Jews
and some Asian Americans are a logical concomitant of the rejection of the
concept of merit. Anti-Semitic propositions are a nearly inescapable implication of the radical constructivist critique of merit. Rejecting merit could
inadvertently leave these writers closer to the rhetoric and politics of Louis
Farrakhan than to those of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Before expanding on our argument, we present a few important
caveats. First and most emphatically, we do not suggest that the scholars
we discuss harbor anti-Semitic feelings, even unconsciously.2 0 We seek to
alert them to logical implications they will surely find unacceptable, in
order to prompt them to rethink their current attachment to radical constructivism. In short, we accuse the theory, not the theorists, of anti-Semitism.2 1
Second, our defense of the concept of merit is a limited one. We do
not contend that the current concept of merit is perfect, nor do we deny that
discrimination against some groups has denied them their due rewards.
Belief in merit is not incompatible with acknowledging that societal standards can be applied in a discriminatory manner. It is also consistent with
an understanding that some groups may not have been given a fair chance
to acquire necessary skills.
constructivism has been applied to the physical sciences, see PAUL R. GRoSS & NoRMAN LB=rrr,
HIGHER SUPERSITION: THE ACADENIC LEFr AND ITs QuARREIS Wrr ScmrcE (1994).
20. We emphasize that we are aware of no information whatsoever that even hints at personal

anti-Semitism on the part of any of these writers. Patricia Williams, a prominent critical race theorist,
has made explicit her rejection of anti-Semitism. See PATmCiA J. WiLLAMS, TaE ALcEMY OF RACE
AND RiGHTs 126-30 (1991).

21.

Indeed, we have located at least one Jewish writer (and we are sure there are others) who

subscribes to the radical position that "the American ideal of meritocracy is a sham." Josh Henkin, The
MeretriciousnessofMerit: Or, Why Jewish Males Oughtn 'tBeSo Smug; Twarm, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 53,

54.
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Third, this is not simply a rehash of the old argument that "some
groups succeeded, so why can't you?"' We are not arguing against discrimination as a cause of social inequality. The point is not that some
minority groups rather than others have managed to overcome discrimination, but that they have somehow succeeded beyond the supposedly dominant majority. This fact is hard to reconcile with the radical constructivist
view that standards of merit are simply tools used by the dominant majority
to maintain its position.
In the first part of this essay, we will try to document our account of
the radical constructivist view of merit. We hope that this documentation
will overcome any doubts that serious scholars have taken as radical a position as we indicate. Where possible we will present direct quotations rather
than our own interpretations.2 3 In the second part of the essay, we work
through the anti-Semitic implications of the constructivist critique of merit.
Finally, we briefly consider alternative theories of merit.
I
TmE CRrTQUE OF MEIT

The meritocratic ideal is that positions in society should be based on
the abilities and achievements of the individual rather than on characteristics such as family background, race, religion, or wealth. According to this
ideal, merit must be objective in the sense of being definable without reference to those personal characteristics.2 4 In a society that uses merit as a
standard for professional success, everyone should have an equal right to
compete for desirable occupations. John Rawls has described the underlying concept of justice as one of careers "open to talents," a concept first
adopted by egalitarians who rejected previous aristocratic understandings of
human worth.25
Under this conventional view, the ultimate conception of merit is colorblind. Its advocates believe that people are treated unjustly and discriminated against "when their merit is assessed according to their status rather
22. See D. Marvin Jones, DarknessMade Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 Gao.
LJ. 437, 487 (1993) (claiming that this argument stems from the notion that blacks are inherently
inferior).
23. Some readers may suggest that the statements we quote are merely hyperbolic rhetoric. We do
not find this a persuasive defense. In our view, scholars who claim to have radical ideas should be taken
at their word, rather than having their theories domesticated into more palatable form. Cf Frances
Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1151 (1989) (challenging popular
"misunderstandings" of CATHAmE A. MACKINNON, FMMNOSM UNMODTnnM: DiscoURSES ON LM's &

LAW (1987)). In any event, if radical constructivists are merely indulging in rhetoric, they should be
made aware that this particular form of rhetoric is fraught with danger.
24. For more extensive explorations of the concept of merit, see ROBiRT KLrrOAARD, CHOOSNO
ELrms (1985); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., To Each According to His Ability, From None According to His
Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law ofAntidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REv. 815 (1980).
25. JowN RAwLs, A TI-oRy oF JusTicE 66 (1971). The replacement of the aristocratic concept of
merit was of course one of the achievements of the Enlightenment.
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' Thus, under this
than according to the value of their traits or products."26
conception of merit, racial discrimination "is irrational and unjust because it
denies the individual what is due him or her under the society's agreed
standards of merit."27
Allegiance to the meritocratic ideal does not preclude support for racebased policies such as affirmative action.2" Randall Kennedy, a firm proponent of affirmative action,2 9 is also one of the most outspoken recent
defenders of the traditional conception of merit.3 0 Kennedy sharply distinguishes affirmative action from decisions based purely on merit:
I simply do not want race-conscious decisionmaking to be naturalized into our general pattern of academic evaluation. I do not want
race-conscious decisionmaking to lose its status as a deviant mode
of judging people or the work they produce. I do not want raceconscious decisionmaking to be assimilated into our conception of
31
meritocracy.
Thus, for advocates of a merit standard, even where race is a legitimate
factor (as in affirmative action programs), consideration of race remains a
regrettable if necessary deviation from the ideal of a color-blind meritocratic system. Other scholars, including some who are considered members of various critical movements, have also defended the general concept
of merit.32
This conventional view of merit has recently come under attack from
legal scholars who not only question the validity of existing standards but
doubt whether there can ever be objective or substantive standards of merit.
This critical stance rejects the possibility that one person could actually be a
"better x" than another: any statement of the form "A is better-than B" is
26. Kennedy, CulturalPluralist supra note 2, at 710 (describing but opposing this position); see
also Daniel Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 THm PuBuc INmaasr 29, 37 (1972) (connecting
antidiscrimination concept with merit standards).
27. Kennedy, CulturalPluralist supra note 2, at 710 (descnbing but opposing this position).
28. Much of the current debate about merit has been sparked by disputes relating to race,
particularly the contentious issue of affirmative action. It would be a mistake, however, to equate the
debate over merit with that over affirmative action. Although the critical scholars discussed in this
section all support affirmative action, they do so for different reasons and have conflicting views about
the relationship between affirmative action and merit.
29. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HLv. L. Rav. 1327 (1986).
30. Although many sins have been committed against true meritocracy, Kennedy argues that the
proper response is "not to scrap the meritocratic ideal" but to reaffirm it. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. Ra,. 1745, 1807 (1989).
31. Id. Another notable recent defense of merit is Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and
"White Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE LJ. 2065, 2071, 2080-85
(1991) (arguing that legal scholarship should be judged by objective standards and proposing a set of
such standards).
32. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson and J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and OtherPerformingArts, 139 U.
PA. L. Rav. 1597, 1614 n.64 (1991) (arguing that merit standards exist in various fields, including law);
cf Mark Tushnet, The Degradationof ConstitutionalDiscourse, 81 GEo. LJ. 251 (1992) (rejecting
radical constructivism generally).
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only another way of saying that the dominant power structure prefers A to
B. Under the constructivist view, merit can play no independent role in
accounting for the relative positions of different groups in society. Rather,
causation runs in the opposite direction: conceptions of merit function as a
method by which the powerful reinforce their dominant position. What
purport to be neutral standards of merit are simply tools of social
subordination.
The rhetoric of radical constructivism is widespread among critical
theorists. Duncan Kennedy, for example, has expressed "a pervasive skepticism" about current societal standards: "[W]e just don't believe that it is
real 'merit' that institutions measure, anywhere in the system .... ,,33 Note
that the observation extends well beyond law schools to encompass all
social institutions. Kennedy believes that "[j]udgments of merit are inevitably culturally and ideologically contingent. ' 34 According to Kennedy, currently dominant groups have the power to create the traditions within which
they make judgments of merit, and these traditions are obviously "culturally
'
and ideologically specific products."35
For example, a conventional law
review article on antitrust can only be judged good "as the product of a
white, ideologically moderate group identity. '36 Thus there can be no
objective standard of merit applicable to all groups within the society.
Kennedy's argument is significantly different from the more moderate position (taken by many theorists, critical or not) that our current definitions of
merit are incomplete and perhaps biased.
To be sure, Kennedy does not push this view to its logical extreme.
He apparently believes that limited judgments regarding merit sometimes
can be made even across various groups and paradigms. 7 Moreover,
despite language speaking more broadly about social institutions, his primary focus is on legal scholarship-indeed, in the final paragraph of the
article he expresses some concerns about the potential social consequences
of extending his view too far.38 Yet, as we have seen, at times his rhetoric
is much broader.
Moreover, his attempted qualifications may have limited efficacy. At
some level, his position remains profoundly relativistic, as shown in the
33. Kennedy, CulturalPluralism,supra note 2, at 708. For similar views by other critical legal
scholars, see Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Questfor Equality of Opportunity:A CriticalLegal

Essay, 23 HDv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 324, 382-85 (1988) (arguing that dominant classes use their
cultural capital to perpetuate standards that legitimate domination by those classes); Gary Peller, Race
Consciousness, 1990 DuKE LJ. 758, 803, 806-07 (arguing that supposedly objective standards are
created by white culture).
34. Kennedy, CulturalPluralism,supra note 2, at 733.
35. Id
36. Id at 755.
37. Id. at 732.
38. Imagining the application of his proposal across the board, according to Kennedy himself,
would destroy much of its appeal and "might lead to all kinds of disastrous unintended side-effects." Id.
at 757.
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following passage: "There are no meta-criteria of merit that determine
which among culturally and ideologically specific research traditions or
scholarly paradigms is 'better' or 'truer.' Judgments of merit are inevitably
culturally and ideologically contingent because they are inevitably paradigm-dependent."3 9 Recall that Kennedy's specific subject is law review
literature. But legal scholarship is not a domain of its own. It brings to
bear the intellectual tools available in our society to the consideration of an
important class of social issues-the evaluation of legal rules and institutions. If we cannot judge between competing paradigms, then we are apparently left with no way of resolving disputes about these issues through
reason. Kennedy's position would suggest, for example, that the libertarian
and feminist perspectives on surrogate motherhood are simply two alternative approaches, equally valid within their own perspective, with no way of
adjudicating the dispute between them. If the paradigms sponsored by different ideological and social groups cannot be comparatively evaluated,
then the dominance of any paradigm can only be due to the power of its
group sponsor. As a practical matter, despite Kennedy's obvious reservations about fully embracing this thesis, in his view merit seems to reduce to
an exercise of group power on behalf of its favored paradigm.
Others have been less hesitant to embrace radical constructivism.
Critical Race Theory adopts a radical repudiation of merit, endorsing the
notion that standards of merit inevitably embody merely the prejudices of
the dominant group. Critical Race Theory thus rejects the validity of current merit standards as applied to minorities.4 ° While purporting to be neutral, current standards of merit are in reality merely tests for whiteness.
"Cultural bias," we are told by John Calmore, "sets standards for performance in terms of the tendencies, skills, or attributes of white America, and it
is against these standards that all other groups are measured."'" Or, as Alex
Johnson puts it, current standards are a "gate built by a white male hegemony that requires a password in the white man's voice for passage." 42
39. Id. at 733.
40.

See Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAnD. L.

REv. 1, 8-9 (1991) (stating that most Critical Race scholars question objectivity of merit standards)
[hereinafter Delgado, Brewer's Plea];see also John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp,
and FireMusic: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a MulticulturalWorld, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2129, 2160-61 (1992) (stating that Critical Race Theory challenges "the universality of white
experience/judgment as the authoritative standard" to be applied to people of color).
41. Calmore, supra note 40, at 2219. Calmore characterizes this as a facet of "cultural racism."
He continues that a related aspect of cultural racism is "the practice of dominant society giving more
value and status to areas in which white people excel or find interest than to those areas in which people
of color have excelled or demonstrated aptitude or interest.' IAt

42. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE LJ. 2007, 2052 (1991). Earlier in
the same article, Johnson writes approvingly of the black nationalist view of "integration as domination

through the imposition of white values and norms-universalist meritocratic standards, for examplethat privilege whites and maintain the subordination of Blacks and other people of color." Id. at 2031;
see also id. at 2052 n.189 (arguing that the current meritocratic system devalues contributions of
scholars of color); id. at 2017-18 (criticizing meritocratic standards). In a puzzling footnote to his
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Richard Delgado, one of the leaders of Critical Race Theory, suggests
that standards of merit are merely preferences for favored groups. "[M]erit
is that which I... use to judge you, the Other. The criteria I use sound
'
suspiciously like a description of me and the place where I stand."43
Refusing to frame the issue of minority participation and representation in
terms of merit standards," Delgado argues that such standards are "like
white people's affirmative action.... A way of keeping their own deficiencies neatly hidden while assuring only people like them get in.,,45 Instead
of affirmative action for law school admissions, he favors "an overhaul of
the admissions process and a rethinking of the criteria that make a person a
deserving law student and future lawyer."" The appropriate transformation
of standards will lead to "a proportionate number of minorities, whites, and
women gaining admission."4 7 For Delgado, seemingly, the question is not
whether standards are valid but whether they are fair, with fairness being
defined as proportional group achievement. Any standard that produces
disproportionate success for a particular group is at best "affirmative
action" for the members of that group, usually implemented by the group
for its own benefit.
Patricia Williams, another prominent critical race theorist, also rejects
the possibility of objective standards of merit. In her view, "[s]tandards are
nothing more than structured preferences. 48 Standards should simply be
criticism of meritocratic standards, Johnson specifically addresses the standards for evaluating
scholarship, and says that this evaluation "is not about 'truth' at all. At best, it is about a form of
consensus among scholars, entirely independent of 'truth' notions, about what is good that is." Id. at

2017 n.43. Despite the obscurity of the last clause, Johnson's footnote does seem intended as an
endorsement of radical constructivisr.
43. Delgado, Brewer's Plea, supra note 40, at 9.
44. Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a MajoritarianDevice: Or, Do You Really Want to Be
a Role Model?, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1222, 1224 (1991) ("Our acquiescence in treating [the issue of

minority representation] as 'a question of standards' is absurd and self-defeating when you consider that
we took no part in creating those standards and their fairness is one of the very things we want to call

into question.").
45. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YAIE LJ. 1357, 1364 (1992).
46. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,
132 U. PA. L. Rav. 561, 572 (1984).
47. Id Some of Delgado's writings may be interpreted to criticize only existing standards rather

than to deny that the concept of merit can have any substance. For example, he says that advocates of
Critical Race Theory "envision racial justice quite differently. In their vision, persons of color would
not need to resemble successful whites to fit in, but would achieve success without sacrificing what is
distinctive about themselves." Delgado, Brewer'sPlea,supra note 40, at 12 n.58. Instead of minorities

meeting current standards of merit, Critical Race Theory envisions the abandonment of those standards
in favor of ones more favorable to people of color. ld.; see also id. at 9 n.43 (suggesting alternative
standards).
Nevertheless, we feel justified in describing Critical Race Theory as a whole as endorsing the more

radical position of rejecting merit entirely. The work of other critical race theorists is less ambiguous, as
we describe in the text. Also, as noted in the text, Delgado himself wavers: he suggests that standards
are arbitrary and that the only standards he would endorse are those that lead to numerically proportional
results.

48. WmLuMs, supra note 20, at 103; see also id. at 99 (arguing that standards are only "mind
funnels').
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restructured "for rather than against-to like rather than dislike-the participation of black people." 49 She continues:
"Quotas," "preference," "reverse discrimination," "experienced,"
and "qualified" are con words, shiny mirror words that work to dazzle the eye with their analogic evocation of other times, other contexts, multiple histories: As a society, we have yet to look carefully
beneath them to see where the seeds of prejudice are truly hidden.5 0
Note that "qualified" and "experienced"--two key concepts of merit-are
among these "con words" that only serve to disguise racism. In Williams'
view, the conventional idea of merit seems to be little more than a sham;
current standards are not merely arbitrary but ultimately founded on
prejudice.
Critical race theorists also contend that current concepts of merit are
invalid even as applied to whites. For example, Derrick Bell rejects the
standards used to evaluate employment and educational qualifications.5 1
Those credentials, Bell argues, "are often irrelevant or of little importance
and therefore serve mainly as barriers to most minorities and a great many
whites as well." 52 He contends that whites at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale should support affirmative action 53 because affirmative
action plans "remove artificial qualification barriers and thus further their
interests as well as those of blacks." 54 For Bell, then, standards are
designed to serve the interests, not of whites generally, but of those subgroups of whites who in fact are the most successful under the standards.
At its most extreme, Critical Race Theory views not only standards of
merit but also achievement itself as inherently group-based, thus completely
repudiating the concept of individual merit. According to John Calmore:
[A]n emphasis on our distinctiveness is not easily accommodated
within the normal arrangements and practices. How people of color
adapt to this situation gives rise to conflicts in orientation, as we
49. Id at 103.
50. Id.
51. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price ofRacial Remedies, 67
CALIF. L. Ray. 3, 8 (1979) [hereinafter Bell, Minority Admissions] ("[Tihere is impressive evidence that
grades and test scores cannot predict success in the practice of law or medicine.'; see also id at 17
(contending that when evaluating faculty applicants law professors naturally rely on arbitrary and biased
criteria such as grades and test scores because they themselves excelled in those areas). In Bell's view,
"the chosen solution--simply recognizing minority exceptions to traditional admissions standards based
on grades and test scores-has served to validate and reinforce traditional policies while enveloping
minority applicants in a cloud of suspected incompetency." Id. at 8.
52. Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affimative Action Mystique, 57 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 1595, 1605
(1989) [hereinafter Bell, Xerces]; see also DmuucK BEL,FACES AT Tm BorroM oF THE WaLL: THE
PERmANrNcE op RAcisM 6 (1992) (arguing that discrimination in the form of supposedly neutral
standards is more oppressive than the blatant racial bias of the pre-Brown era).
53. See Bell,Xerces, supra note 52, at 1605; see also Bell, MinorityAdmissions, supra note 51, at
7-8 (arguing that the race issue is used to distract lower class whites from their own situation).
54. Bell, Xerces, supra note 52, at 1605. See also Bell, Minority Admissions, supra note 51, at
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must emphasize whether we are more directed by assimilation or
autonomy, by individualself-fulfillment or collective responsibility,
by group accommodation or group resistance. Critical race scholars
adopt in each case the latter orientation.55
For this reason, Calmore is concerned about the risk that black intellectuals
will "buy into" a "profoundly individualistic orientation" by accepting a
"color-blind academic world." "Too often," he continues, "people of color
assume the voice of a distinct individual."56 By the same token, Calmore
attacks integrationists who seek incorporation for their group into the larger
society, "obtaining for its members the greatest possibilities for their individual self-development." 7 Although this forthright attack on individualism is not expressed by all critical race theorists, it does seem to be a logical
development of the critique of merit. For if merit is merely an empty field
on which groups battle for power, the real credit for success should go to
the group rather than to its individual soldiers, and striving for individual
success jeopardizes the group's solidarity and discipline.58
Radical constructivism thus differs substantially from mainstream
arguments in favor of affirmative action, which usually accept the general
validity of existing standards, at least as applied to whites, but advocate
separate consideration for people of color. Constructivism suggests that
racial problems could be readily solved if the necessary social resolve to
change standards existed. The implication is that African Americans and
other people of color (as well as white women) could quickly attain economic and academic equality once society eliminates the arbitrary standards
that limit their access to desirable positions.
Just as Critical Race Theory conceives of merit as maintaining white
dominance, radical feminism views merit as perpetuating gender hierarchies. According to radical feminists, existing social standards are inherently geared to males.5 9 As Catharine MacKinnon puts it, the current
55. Calmore, supra note 40, at 2187 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 2195 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 2226 (footnote omitted).
58. Cf. Robert S. Chang, Toward An Asian American Legal Scholarship: CriticalRace Theory,

Post-Structuralism,and Narrative Space, 81 CALw. L. REv. 1241, 1322 (1993) ("[lI]t is only through
solidarity that we will one day be free to express our diversity."); Peller, supra note 33, at 834
(describing the black nationalist concern that individual success within the black middle class may
undermine the black community).
59.

For example, consider the following statement:

More fundamentally unfair is the inherent bias in the concept of merit itself. This is a
result of what Andrea Dworkin calls the power of naming; "this power of naming enables
men to define experience, to articulate boundaries and values, to designate to each thing its
realm and qualities, to determine what can and cannot be expressed, to control perception

itself." Merit is defined by white men to reward what white men become. Merit, as we know
it, explicitly values particular experiences and abilities-the ones developed by white upper
class men-and therefore implicitly devalues others. They define the content of the standard
according to capacities their situation finds valuable and name it "excellence." Meritocracy
calls those who conform to this standard "equal." Those who are different, it names
"unqualified." The relative worth of particular experiences is not my issue; the ability of

HeinOnline -- 83 Cal. L. Rev. 864 1995

1995]

IS THE RADICAL CRITIQUE OF MERIT ANTI-SEMITIC?

865

standards simply reflect "what white men value about themselves,"60 constituting an "affirmative action plan" for men.6 ' Like critical race theorists,
then, radical feminists believe that merit is simply a weapon used to
empower dominant groups while subordinating others, and that to succeed

is merely to be preferred arbitrarily because of one's group affiliation.
Consequently, women should not be required either to conform or to ask for
accommodation of the standards to their needs; the standards themselves
must be jettisoned.6 2
The attack on merit is an integral component of a broader philosophical position. As Gary Peller points out, the attack on merit is grounded in
the "critique of objectivity and liberal notions of knowledge pressed by radical feminists and critical race theorists."63 Others have also noted the
affinities between some trends in modem philosophy on the one hand and

radical feminist or multicultural criticism on the other.' 4 It is commonplace
among radical feminists to characterize knowledge as socially constructed,
in what they term a repudiation of the ideals of individualism, objectivism,
and rationalism propounded by traditional scholars.6 5 For example, in criti-

quing traditional law school pedagogy, Linda Hirshman decries the current

white men to control the determination of their relative worth is. The content of the notion of
merit, in and of itself, excludes and devalues women and people of color. The distribution of
opportunities on that basis necessarily excludes and devalues them also.
Diana M. Poole, On Merit, 1 LAW & INEQ. J. 155, 157 (1983) (citation omitted).
60. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1291
(1991); see also id. at 1289-90 (arguing that after the recognition in Brown v. Board of Education that
black children are the same as white children, "[b]eing the same as the dominant group remained the
equality test" justifying disparate treatment for anyone who is different).
61. CATH~uNu A. MAcKnNoN, FEm UsM UNMODIwmD: DiscousaES ON LrE AND LAW 36

(1987).
62. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness ofLegal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standardin
Theory and Practice 77 CoiNmLL L. Ra,. 1398 (1992) (arguing that the "reasonable woman" standard
requires women to conform to stereotypes and images constructed largely by men); Christine A.
Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CALF. L. REv. 1279, 1313-14 (1987) (defining gender
equality as acceptance, not accommodation, of women's differences); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism
Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence,75 IowA L.
REv. 1135, 1150 (1990) (criticizing men's definitions of women and definitions that describe women in
terms of men); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CGI.L. Ray. 1, 4 (1988) (arguing that
development of a true feminist jurisprudence requires rejection of male-oriented mainstream
jurisprudence).
63. Peller, supra note 7, at 339.
64. See, eg., SravEN CoNNoR, PoSmToDEisr CULTuRE: AN InRODUcTION TO Trsonias oF
rum CoNTEimoR a
186-89, 230-33 (1989); DAVID HARVEY, Tim CoNDnroN oF Pos-rMoDm1NrY: AN
ENQumY INro THE OminlNs op CuLTuRtAL CHANa 42, 47-48 (1989).
65. See e.g., Williams, supra note 19 at 71. Williams provides a sympathetic introduction to
social constructivism and its relationship with feminism. Id. at 64-75. For non-legal accounts of
rationality and knowledge as socially constructed (and male), see, e.g., ELIZABETH KAMARCK Mnmnca,
TRSFoRmaiN KNOWLEDGE (1990); Joyce Trebilcot, Dyke Methods: or Principlesfor the Discovery!
Creationof the Withstanding, HYPATIA, Summer 1988, at 1.
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"medieval orthodoxy about what counts as knowledge" because it
"ensbrine[s] a private order of male dominance.1 66
In addition to their philosophical perspectives, these critical theorists
also have political reasons for repudiating merit. Rejecting the idea of merit
is a useful way to explain differing success rates between groups without

raising hard questions. If success is influenced by merit, racial differentials
must be attributable to nature, nurture, or discrimination (or some combination of these). Either the less successful groups are born with fewer of the

traits that lead to "good" performance, or their upbringing or environment
discourages the development of those traits, or they possess the same traits
but are denied equal recognition and reward.
None of these alternate explanations suits the political agenda of criti-

cal theorists. As does virtually everyone else, critical theorists deny that

people of color are simply less gifted by nature.6 7 Critical race theorists
also reject the possibility that some aspects of particular minority cultures

might somehow incline their children against the traits that encourage
68
success.

Discrimination is the most promising explanation of differing success
rates, but it does not fully satisfy the needs of critical theorists for several

reasons. First, many critical theorists focus their attention on the hiring of

university professors, 69 where current hiring policies undermine claims of

facial discrimination against people of color.70 Maintaining that "merit" is
itself racially biased circumvents this problem. Second, to the extent that
the black middle class has succeeded as discrimination has diminished,
66. Linda R. Hirshman, Foreword: The Waning of the Middle Ages, 69 Cm.-KmEr L. REv.293,
297-98 (1993).
67. The occasional eccentric suggestion that African Americans (or other minority groups) are
intellectually inferior usually meets with a firestorm of criticism. See, e.g., Charles Lane, The Tainted
Sources of "The Bell Curve", N.Y. Rav. oF BooKs, Dec. 1, 1994 at 14; NEw REPtBLIC, Oct. 31, 1994
(symposium on RicHARD J. HER.RNsTErn & CaALES MURRAY,Twm BELL Cuav: INTELLioENCE Am
CLAss SauRcrutE INAMmucAN LFE (1994)).
68.

There is some evidence that black ghetto culture may do so. See GERALD D. JAvNEs & ROBIN

M. WV .s, JR., Ens., A COmmON D mw : BLAcKs An AmERICAN SocaarY 372 (1989) (discussing
how black student peer culture may discourage academic success); John J. O'Connor, Television View:
The Curse of Incessant Cursing, N.Y. TIrams, July 31, 1994, § 2, at I (arguing that black pop culture
encourages the use of language that is detrimental to success in the American mainstream).
69. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 46 at 572; Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over
Affirmative Action, 82 CALw.L. Ray. 893 (1994); Charles R. Lawrence 111, Minority Hiring in AALS
Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 429 (1986).
70. A recent report by the American Association of Law Schools reports the following facts about
minority hiring:
1. Between one-fifth and one-quarter of all new hires were minorities.
2. Minority candidates who participated in the faculty recruiting conference were much
more likely (20% as opposed to 13%) to obtain teaching jobs. One minority professor is
ultimately hired for every 1.9 minority candidates at the recruiting conference, but only one
white for every 3.4 white candidates.
3. Even larger percentages of minority law teachers have been recruited outside of the
AALS process.
Richard A. White, StatisticalReport on the Gender and Minority Composition of New Law Teachers
and AALS Faculty Appointments Register Candidates, 44 J. LEoAL EDUC. 424, 429-30 (1994).
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while the black underclass has nevertheless fallen further behind,71 the
argument that current discrimination is a primary cause of differential success rates between blacks and whites rings hollow. Such a claim fails to
explain the recent growth of the black underclass at all, and it suggests that
what African Americans-and by extension other disadvantaged groupsneed is to continue battling discrimination, to stay on the course that
Thurgood Marshall proposed and nine white men adopted in 1954.
Finding all the possible answers unsatisfactory, radical constructivists
change the question. Instead of asking whether all races are judged by the
same standards and have the same opportunities, they argue that the unequal success rates are per se proof of unjust treatment. Rejecting the idea
of merit simultaneously avoids questions about the potential causes of differential success rates and allows radical constructivists to treat those differential rates as sufficient justification for remedial action.
The challenge to societal standards of merit is not limited, however, to
Critical Legal Studies, radical feminism, or Critical Race Theory. We find
especially evocative an essay about Felix Frankfiuter by the distinguished
legal historian G. Edward White. 72 According to White, Frankfurter idealized the Harvard Law School of his youth as a pure meritocracy: "What
mattered," said Frankfurter, "was excellence in your profession to which
your father or your face was equally irrelevant." The law school was a
place where "[a]ll this big talk about 'leadership' and character, and all the
other things that are nonascertainable, but usually are high-falutin' expressions for personal likes and dislikes, or class, or color, or religious partialities or antipathies-they were all OUt."17 3 The "great thing" about the law
school was "that Skull & Bones, Hasty Pudding, wealth, family fortune,
skin, creed-nothing particularly mattered, except scholarship and character- objectively ascertained."7"
White expresses serious reservations about Frankfurter's meritocratic
views. Frankfurter, who played an influential role in staffing New Deal
agencies, made it a project to bring into government young men whom he
considered particularly bright.75 Applying constructivist analysis, White
questions the merit standards used by Frankfurter in his placement
activities:
Each of the premises on which the 1930s placement networks were
based-the idea of meritocracy, the assumption that merit could be
71.

See, e.g., JAYNms & ViL.Lu~ms, supra note 68, at 274-77; CHARLus MuRRAY, LOSING

GROUND: AMmuCAN SociAL PoLicy 1950-1980, at 140 (1984) (presenting graphs of income and

employment).
72. G. EDWARD \Vrm, Felix Frankfurter,the Old Boy Networ, and the New Deal: The
Placement of Elite Lawyers in Public Service in the 1930's, in lNERvENmoN AND DErcmMENT:
EssAYs IN LEoAL HisToiy Am JutrspiUmDicE 149 (1994).
73. Id at 154.
74. Id. at 155.
75.

Id at 165.
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objectively determined, the correlation between performance in law
school and competence as a lawyer, and the belief that individuals
with higher grades were "better" and would therefore "make a difference" in the performance of the institutions they joined-appears
to be vulnerable to the claim of latent cultural bias.... [T]hose who
emerge in positions of power within the system will have demonstrated [these] qualities, and by insisting on the "importance" of
such qualities those persons justify their own success. 7 6
White's comment on the hiring standards for New Deal posts closely
resembles the radical constructivists' attack on hiring standards for teaching
positions.
In light of this critique, it is somewhat jarring to recall that the beneficiaries of the placement network were disproportionately Jewish."
Frankfurter's placement activities have one aura if he was in fact hiring the
most talented lawyers, who simply happened to be Jewish. But if this meritocratic ground is invalid, as White suggests, Frankfurter's conduct looks
disturbingly like special favoritism for members of his own ethnic group. 78
The critique of merit indeed takes on an odd and uncomfortable visage
in the light of the Jewish case. Consider law school faculties. As Posner
observed in his response to Duncan Kennedy, "if any group is overrepresented in law schools, it is not WASPs, but Jews."7 9 By 1970, Robert
Burt reports, "25 percent of the faculties in American law schools were
Jews, while among 'elite' law schools Jews constituted 38 percent of the
faculties."8 If the purported merit bases for selection are invalid, one must
wonder just how to account for figures that are so high above the proportion
of Jews in the general population. 8 1 If these positions have not been fairly
won on their merits, what is one to make of this unequal distribution of
employment opportunities?
If "faculties distribute political resources (jobs) through a process that
is political in fact, if not in name," 82 it is hard to countenance the award of
25%-40% of those jobs to a group that is less than three percent of the
76. Id at 167.
77. See PzrER H. IRONS, THE NEw DEAL.LAWYERS 6 (1982) (observing that Jews and Catholics
were especially well-represented in New Deal agencies).
78. The same criticism could be made of Louis Brandeis, who worked to find faculty positions for
Jewish lawyers. See ROBERT A. BuRT,Two JEWISH JUsTIcEs: OUTrcAsrs INTa PROMISED LAND 64-65
(1988).
79.
80.

Posner, supra note 3, at 1158.
BURT, supra note 78, at 64; accord CHARIiS E. SuanIMAN, A CERTAIN PEOPLE: AMERICAN

JEWS Am THEIR LrvEs TODAY 99 (1985). An unpublished survey of the top 100 law schools indicates
that in late 1993, 27% of the faculty at those schools was Jewish. James Lindgren, "Measuring
Diversity." By comparison, Jews constitute less than 3% of the population of the United States. See

Barry Kosmin & Jeff Scheckner, Jewish Population in the United States, 1989, in AmEiucA JEWISH
YEARBOOK 1990, at 278, 281 (David Singer and Ruth R. Seldin eds., 1990).

81. Nor is disproportionate Jewish achievement limited to law schools. See infra text
accompanying notes 86, 91-92.
82. Kennedy, Cultural Pluralist,supra note 2, at 732.
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general population. Or consider the assertion that merit standards are
affirmative action for the dominant group, a method of "keeping their own
deficiencies neatly hidden while assuring only people like them get in." 83
The intended reference was to "white people," but given the figures on law
faculties, it is clear that at "elite" schools one might as well be in fact referring to Jews, which would give the statement a somewhat chilling overtone.
Or, if merit standards are only "structured preferences," and could just as
well be restructured "to like rather than dislike" other groups,' one must
wonder how they came to be structured to "like" Jews better than Gentiles.
This difficulty stems from the theory of standards shared by all of the
critics discussed above. Under this theory, the standards of merit embraced
by society cannot be considered neutral or objective or even the product of
historical happenstance; rather, they are primarily designed to support the
power of dominant groups. Thus, a group's success cannot be justified on
the basis of any presumed excellence in the performance of its members.
As applied to so-called "model minorities" like Jews or some groups of
Asian Americans, however, this creates a paradox, for these groups seem to
have succeeded in important social arenas beyond the average achievements
of the dominant majority of white Gentiles. In the next section, we will
consider possible methods of avoiding this paradox, and we conclude that
none of them is remotely acceptable. We then suggest that the basic premise of the radical constructivists should be reexamined. Perhaps there is
something to the idea of merit after all.
II
ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE CRmTQUE OF MERIT

Since merit can be difficult to identify or even to define-especially in
a field as fluid as law 8 5 -radical constructivists appear to have hit on an
almost invulnerable strategy for explaining the relative lack of success of
some minority groups and for demanding radical remedial steps. There are,
however, two problems with their theory: Jews and native-born Asian
Americans. By almost every measure of success, both groups succeed at far
higher rates than white Gentile Americans. In 1970, Jewish family income
was 172% of the average American income, Japanese-American family
income was 132% of the average, and Chinese-American family income
was 112% of the average. 8" By 1980, native-born Chinese Americans were
83.

See supra text accompanying note 45.

84. See supra text accompanying note 49.
85. For a variety of viewpoints on legal scholarship, see, e.g., A Symposium on Legal Scholarship
63 U. COLa. L. Rav. 521 (1992); Symposium, Legal Scholarship:Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE
LJ.955 (1981); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal

Narratives,45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993).
86. THOMAS Sowvmu, ETmnc AMmUCA: A HIsroRY 5 (1981) (original figures derived from 1970
census data); see also EssAYS Aism DATA ON AmEPICAN EhmNc GRouPs 257-58 (Thomas Sowell ed.

1978); Sidney Goldstein, American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile, in AmcmrcAN JEWISH
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earning 150% of the non-Hispanic white average, with Japanese- and
Korean-American families not far behind the Chinese Americans. 87 As of
that year, unemployment rates for Chinese, Japanese, and Korean
88
Americans were approximately half that of the general population.
Poverty rates are also significantly lower for some Asian American

groups.8 9 More recent data similarly reveal that Jewish family income

remains well above the average income for Gentile families.90
Educational attainment has accompanied this economic success. Jews
and Asian Americans are disproportionately represented in higher education: In 1982, Jews obtained undergraduate degrees at nearly twice the rate
of the general American population; 9' in 1990, the percentage of Jews with
some college education was almost twice that of the general population.92
Asian Americans also completed college at twice the rate of the general
population.93 Americans of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean ancestry comprise approximately one-fifth of the student body at some prestigious uni-

versities, even though they are less than two percent of the national
population.9 4 Although many universities implemented quotas to limit
Jewish students and faculty from the early 1920s through at least the early

1960s, 95 by 1975 Jews "constituted 10 percent of all faculty members but

YEARBOOK 1971, at 3,79-85 (Morris Fine & Milton Himmelfarb eds., 1971) (reporting that compared to
the general population there are more Jews in high-income categories and fewer in low-income
categories).
87.

U.S. COMMISSION ON CvI

RIGHTS, Tim ECONOMIC STATUS OF AMERICANS OF ASIAN

DEscE.r: AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION 29 (1988) [hereinafter ECONOMIC STATUS]; see also
STANLEY LIEBERSON & MARY C. WATERS, FROM MANY STRANDS: ETHNic AND RAcIAL GROUPS IN
CoNTEMPoRARY AMERICA 138-39 (1988). Even including foreign-born Asian Americans (who typically
earn less than their native-born counterparts) does not eliminate the disparity entirely. ECONOMIC
STATUS, supra, at 29. Moreover, the disparity is not solely the result of more family members working:
these groups of native-born Asian American men and women also have higher individual annual and
hourly earnings than non-Hispanic whites. See id. at 68, 90.
88. ECONOMIC STATUS, supra note 87, at 61-62.
89. U.S. GNERAL. AccoUNTING OFFIcE, ASIAN AMEmCANS: A STATUS REPORT 23 (1990)
[hereinafter STATUS REPORT].
90. SLBEPaN,supra note 80, at 118 (noting that in 1984, percentage of Jewish households with
incomes above $50,000 was four times the percentage of non-Hispanic white households); see generally
GERALD KREFETz, JEWS AN MONEY: THE MYTHS AND TaE REALrtry (1982).
91. KREFE~z, supra note 90, at 35-36.
92. Sidney Goldstein, Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 Jewish Population
Survey, in A~mRIcAN JEWISH YEARBOOK 1992, at 77, 110-11 (David Singer & Ruth R. Seldin eds.,

1992).
93. STATUS REPORT, supra note 89, at 26.
94. HENRY RosovsY, THE UNrEBsrrY: AN OWNR'S MANUAL 67 n.12 (1990). See also
EcoNormc STATUS, supra note 87, at 55 (many groups of Asian-American men have more years of
schooling than non-Hispanic white men).
95. NATHAN C. BEmLT, A PRo sE TO KEEP: A NARRTrvE OF Tm AmERICAN ENCOUNTER WITH
ANrI-SEMITism 96-110, 185-97 (1979); LEONARD DNNERmN, ANTasmrnsMTS
IN AMERICA 84-87

(1994); ALAN M. DERsHowrrz, CnurzPAH 66-71 (1991) (discussing Harvard's efforts at reducing
Jewish matriculation in the 1920s).
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20 percent of those teaching at elite universities."9 6 If there is no such thing
as merit, what explains the success of these two groups, both of whom, like
blacks, have been victims of discrimination by white Gentile America?9 7
Focusing on Jews in particular, we can identify only a few conceivable
explanations unconnected with merit, all of them unacceptable both to us
and to critical theorists. If merit is wholly irrelevant, the four possible
explanations for Jewish success are: (1) that a Jewish conspiracy exists; (2)
that Jews are parasitic on American culture; (3) that American culture is
essentially Jewish; or (4) that there is no such thing as a distinct Jewish
culture or identity. We will deal with each explanation in detail.9 8 Without
attempting to discredit or evaluate the validity of any of the explanations,
we will merely note their anti-Semitic overtones. Unless there is yet
another explanation besides merit for Jewish success in a Gentile world,
denying the role of merit has clear anti-Semitic implications. 9 We have no
doubt that radical constructivists will find each of these theories as unacceptable as we do. We hope, accordingly, that they will be led to reexamine
their critique of merit.
The first theory is that Jews succeed as a consequence of a powerful
and pervasive Jewish conspiracy. Some Americans believe that there is a
Jewish or Zionist conspiracy, which has been posited as an explanation for
everything from violence on television 0 0 to the spread of AIDS.' 0 '
96.

SmzERMAN,

supra note 80, at 144. Moreover, Jews tend to publish at higher rates than their

colleagues: In 1975, 24% of those academics who had published twenty or more articles were Jewish.
Id.
97. For accounts of past and present discrimination against Asian Americans, see, e.g., RONALD
TAxAm, STmRoMs FROM A Drn'RaNer SHoRPE: A HIsToRy oF AsIAN Am.mucANs 101-03, 479-84
(1989); Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1, 9-24, 54 (1994). For accounts of discrimination against Jews, see, e.g., Dm mraN,
supra note 95; ROBERT S. XVmucH, ArismarrtsM: THE LONGsTr HATRED 114-25 (1991). Indeed,
American prejudices against African Americans on the one hand and Asian Americans and Jews on the
other have much in common. Asian Americans have often been included with African Americans as the

subject of particular discriminatory laws and stereotypes. See, eg., JomH W. DowaR, WAR WrrsouT
MERcy: RACE Asm POWER rN Tma PACnHc WAR 147-80 (1986); TAxAia, supra, at 100-03. Those

whites who are prejudiced against Jews tend also tend to be prejudiced against blacks. See, e.g.,
GREGoRY MARTmE & RuH CLAX, ANi-SrEMaTsM iN ma UNITED STATES: A Sru=Y oF PR.EJDicE IN

m

1980s 57-58 (1982); PAUL M. S~rntast

& THOMAS PIAZZA, TaE SCAR oF RACE 52-53 (1993).

But as Thomas Sowell points out, "if bigotry alone was a sufficient causal explanation [for a group's
poverty], Jews and Japanese would not be among the most prosperous American ethnic groups."

SowEu., supra note 86, at 274.
98. we will also consider some variations on these arguments, some of which are more benign but
not available to radical constructivists.
99. For similar reasons, denying the role of merit has racist implications when applied to the
success of Asian Americans. Although we focus primarily on anti-Semitism, we also discuss racism
against Asian Americans where appropriate.
100. Blaming Jews for violence on television is an outgrowth of the belief that Jews dominate
Hollywood. See ARNOLD FoRsTER & BENJAMIN R. EPpmI, THE Naw ANrI-SEMrrlSM 109-11, 210

(1974) (describing the allegations of Truman Capote and Louis Farrakhan that Jews control the media);
Bernard einraub, Stereotype of Jews is Revived, N.Y. Tayms, Nov. 7, 1994, at Cl 1.
101. See DNEvsxmn, supra note 95, at 221-22 (describing a favorable reaction among many
blacks to the statement by Steve Cokely, Chicago mayoral aide, that Jewish doctors are injecting black
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The existence of a powerful Jewish conspiracy would certainly explain
why Jews as a group are successful even if success has nothing to do with
merit. It is also, of course, one of the most ancient anti-Semitic myths.
With roots dating back at least to medieval Christianity, the Jewish conspiracy theory persisted through the Reformation and into modernity.' 0 2
Martin Luther, for example, viewed Jews as a menace to Christianity and as
(in the words of one Reformation historian) the "storm troops of the devil's
forces." 10 3 Luther had little doubt about the appropriate remedy:
First, [I advise you] to set fire to their synagogues or schools
and to bury and cover with dirt whatever will not bum, so that no
man will ever again see a stone or cinder of them....
Second, I advise that their houses also be razed and
destroyed .... Instead they might be lodged under a roof or in a
barn, like the gypsies....
Third, I advise that all their prayerbooks and Talmudic writings, in which such idolatry, lies, cursing, and blasphemy are taught,
be taken from them.
Fourth, I advise that their rabbis be forbidden to teach henceforth on pain of loss of life and limb." °
The Jewish conspiracy theory both feeds on and fosters anti-Semitism,
portraying Jews as using devious or evil means to gain power over innocent
non-Jews. It has spawned various myths, including the belief that Jews
used the blood of Christian babies in the Passover seder'0 5 and that Jews
caused the Black Death by poisoning wells. 10 6 It takes its most powerful
babies with AIDS virus); see also Arthur Hertzberg, Is Anti-Semitism Dying Out?, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS,
June 24, 1993, at 51, 52 (noting that even some middle class blacks subscribe to the AIDS myth).
102. WrsTwci, supra note 97, at 29-32 (describing medieval anti-Semitic myths); JOEL
CARNMCHAEL,

TBE

SATANIZING OF THE JEWs: ORIIN AND DEVEaOPMENT OF MYsIcAL ANTI-SEMITISM

44-93 (1992). One occasionally finds hints of it even among modem American jurists. See Steven
Lubet, That's Funny, You Don't Look Like You Control the Government: The Sixth Circuit'sNarrative
on Jewish Power, 45 Hastings L. J. 1527 (1994) (describing and criticizing Sixth Circuit attribution of
Jewish influence over the Justice Department).
103. Hanco A. OBnMA, Tan ROOTS OF ANrsE MsM rN Ta AoE OF RENAIssANcE AND
REFORmATo:N 117 (James I. Porter trans., 1984).

104. MARrN LtrHER, On The Jews and TheirLies, in 47 LUTHER's WoRKs 137, 268-69 (Franklin
Sherman & Helmut T. Lehman eds., Martin H. Bertram trans., 1971). Luther's angry diatribe goes on,

finally concluding that the best course is simply to banish Jews altogether. Id. at 272; see also
CAmacHAEt, supra note 102, at 80-85.

105. See DZbINERsTaEN, supra note 95, at xxii-xxiii, 28, 101 (giving examples of the prevalence of
such rumors from the 12th to the 20th centuries); Wisrucl, supra note 97, at 31, 207, 310-11; Robert
Chazan, Medieval Anti-Semitism, in HisToRY Am HATE: Tam DrmENsIONS OF AwnT-SaMmsM 49, 61
(David Berger ed., 1986).
106. See, eg., CAprcHAEL., supra note 102, at 74; DINNERsTmN, supra note 95, at xxv; WIsrucH,
supra note 97, at 29, 32-33; see also David Berger, Anti-Semitism: An Overview, in HISTORY AND HATE:

THE DnuNsioNs OF ANTI-SmmM, supra note 105, at 3, 7 (noting belief that Jewish doctors poisoned
their patients); cf.DAVID RENmIcK, LEmN's TOME: Tam LAST DAY s OF Tm SoviEr EM PIRE 91-92, 9697 (1993) (describing "Doctors Plot," which charged Jewish doctors with poisoning Party officials).
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modem form in the fraudulent Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which pur10 7
ports to document a Jewish conspiracy to destroy the Christian world.

Although the Protocols have been thoroughly discredited, 10 8 and were

admitted to be a forgery by their American publisher, Henry Ford, in
1927,109 some Americans still believe in them.
Similar myths of an Asian conspiracy also abound. Fears of a "yellow
peril," an Asian conspiracy to obliterate white civilization, were rampant in
the first decades of this century. 110 During World War 11, Japanese were

depicted as single-mindedly conspiring toward world conquest."'

Even

today, Japanese economic success is sometimes attributed to deviousness or

a desire to dominate the world." 2 The Protocols of the Elders of Zion finds
its anti-Asian counterpart in the Tanaka Memorial. The Tanaka Memorial
was a document purportedly presented by Prime Minister Tanaka to
Emperor Hirohito in 1927, outlining Japanese plans for world domination.' 13 Like the Protocols, it was widely accepted as genuine, although it

was almost certainly fraudulent.'
Conspiracy theories are a powerful tool for those who wish to portray
themselves as innocent victims of the successful or feared Other. Such theories have been used to justify everything from university quotas on both
Jews and Asian Americans 1 5 to the Holocaust" 6 and the forced relocation
and internment of Japanese Americans during World War 11.117 Conspiracy
theories were also used, with tragic success, to justify increasingly harsh
This charge is strikingly similar to the current charge that Jewish doctors are injecting black babies with
the AIDS virus. See supra note 101.
107. See e-g., NoRMAN COHN, WARIANT FOR GENocwoE: THE MYTH OF a JEWISH WORLDCONsPmAcy AND THE PROTOCOLS OF Tm EriEs OF ZIoN (1966); CARivucHaE, supra note 102, at
138-40; Dn, EasrN, supra note 95, at 80-83 (providing the history of the publication and circulation
of the Protocols); Wm mcH, supra note 97, at 253-54 (discussing the adoption of the Protocols into
current Arab thought).
108. KREFErz, supra note 90, at 48; Wismci, supra note 97, at 107.
109. BL.TH, supra note 95, at 81-82.
110. See DowER, supra note 97, at 156-64, 172-73.
111. Id. at20-21,83-84.
112. Id. at 313-14.
113. John J. Stephan, The Tanaka Memorial (1927): Authentic or Spurious?, 7 MOD. ASIAN STUD.
733, 733 (1973).
114. Id at 739-43.
115. For discussions of university quotas against Jews, see, e.g., DINNaRrN, supra note 95, at
84-87 (quoting, at 86, Dartmouth President Ernest Hopkins: "Any college which is going to base its
admissions wholly on scholastic standing will find itself with an infinitesimal proportion of anything
else than Jews eventually."); DAN A. ORENw, JOINING nm CLUB: A HisroRY OF JEws AND YALE (1985);
S1LBERmAN, supra note 80, at 52-55; MARciA G. SmNo-rr, THE HALF-OPENaED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION
AND ADmisSIONS AT HAR VARD, YALE, AND PIcCETON, 1900-1970, at 20, 112 (1979) (stating that in
1926 Harvard began to reduce its Jewish enrollment from 25-27% to 10-16%, and that in 1942 the
Committee on Admission continued to make references to "the 'quota.' "). For discussions of the
growing use of quotas against Asian Americans, see, e.g., JAYJIA HsLA, ASIAN AmmaucANs IN HIGHER
EDUCATION AND AT VoRK, 1 92-119 (1988); Chew, supra note 97, at 61-64.
116. See, e.g., CARMicHAEL, supra note 102, at 152-80; CoHN, supra note 107, at 194-215.
117. See, e.g., DowaR, supra note 97, at 79-81; TAK- m, supra note 97, at 388-405.

HeinOnline -- 83 Cal. L. Rev. 873 1995

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:853

treatment of black slaves in order to prevent slave revolts.' 18 Radical constructivists surely abhor such conspiracy theories and agree that they have
no place in academic thought.
A second conceivable explanation for disproportionately high rates of
success among Jews is that they are chameleons who, with no culture of
their own, take on the cultural coloration of the society around them.
Indeed, they are so successful at imitating cultural norms that they outperform "authentic" members of the society. The negative aspect of this
stereotype is not the purported adaptability, which could be considered a
positive trait. Rather, it is the specific form of that adaptation, which is
described as purely imitative with no creative component.
This negative portrayal of Jews as parasitic, unimaginative imitators
who succeed on the backs of the truly deserving is typical of anti-Semitism.
Historically, Jews have been portrayed as soulless parasites on the surrounding culture. In the mid-nineteenth century, French scholar Ernest
Renan claimed that Jews had "no mythology, no epic, no science, no philosophy, no fiction, no plastic arts, no civic life; there is no complexity, nor
nuance; an exclusive sense of uniformity."11' 9 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, an
early French socialist, characterized "the Jew" as "unproductive," and "an
intermediary, always fraudulent and parasitical, who operates in business as
in philosophy, by forging, counterfeiting, sharp practices.' 20 The composer Richard Wagner similarly portrayed Jews--especially assimilated
Jews-as "the most heartless of all human beings," lacking passion, soul,
music, or poetry.12 1 In the early twentieth century, an American antiSemite belittled Jewish academic success as "simply another manifestation
of the acquisitiveness of the race," describing Jews as "clever, acute, and
industrious rather than able in the highest sense."' 22 In publications that
have now become notorious, the deconstructionist Paul de Man took a similar position during World War II about the contribution of Jews to Western
23
literature.1
Jews are not the only group whose success has been linked to this
character defect. Asians, especially the Japanese, have similarly been
118. See JOHN LoFToN, NsuIRREcoN iN SouTH CARotINA: Tm Tuuzmr WoRLD OF DE~mAcR
VEsEY 138, 196-97 (1964); Michael K. Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book The

Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavey, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the

Fourteenth Amendment, 68 Cm.-KmEr L. REv. 1113, 1123-24, 1133-34 (1993); cf. WmumA W.
FR EHNG, 1 THE ROAD TO DisumoN: SEcwssioNsrs AT BAY 1776-1854, at 254 (1990) (describing the
imprisonment of free black sailors resulting from fears of conspiracy). See generally A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only As an Enemy": The Legitimization of Racial
Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. Rav. 969

(1992).
119. WismuH, supra note 97, at 47. Renan also claimed that Jews lacked creativity. Id.
120. CARmCHAEr, supra note 102, at 117.
121. WimucH, supra note 97, at 56.
122. DnaEEsTmN, supra note 95, at 64.
123. Paul de Man, The Jews in ContemporayLiterature, LESom, Mar. 4, 1941, reprinted in DAVID
LasAN,SIGNs OF THE Trass: DECONSTRUCTION AND TE FAU. OF PAUL DE MAN 269-71 app. (1991).
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described as imitative and without a culture of their own. In 1944, an
American missionary with extensive experience in Japan wrote: "The
Japanese have lost much irreparably by not having a great art, a great
poetry, a great drama, to introduce to the Western world."' 2 4 A U.S. Navy
publication of the same era described even premodern Japan as a "thirdhand culture," adding that the Japanese response to modernity had been
"borrowing this and copying that, never inventing, but always adapting
western machines, western arms, and western techniques to their own
uses."'1 5 Portrayals of the Japanese as primarily good mimics continued
after World War 11,126 and are still occasionally found today.' 2 7 The prevalent modem American stereotype of Asian Americans as technically skilled
but without leadership abilities' might be at least partly derived from the
longstanding belief that many Asians lack cultural or creative abilities.
This supposed deficiency explains the ability of both Jews and Asian
Americans to abandon any independent cultural identity and assume the
129
character of the dominant culture.
A third possible explanation for Jewish success, and the converse of
the parasitic explanation, is that mainstream American culture and standards are in their essence not white (or Gentile) but Jewish. Jews succeed,
according to this explanation, because American culture has taken on
Jewish characteristics. If this theory is correct, it is little surprise that socie30
tal standards of merit are structured to "like" the participation of Jews.'
The strong version of this theory is that Jews have somehow infiltrated
American culture. Given the views of American society held by radical
constructivists, this theory has strikingly anti-Semitic implications. These
writers routinely portray mainstream American culture as overwhelmingly
unappealing: narrow, unimaginative, intolerant, ignorant, and at least occasionally evil.13 ' If American culture is really Jewish culture, then Jews are
124. DowER, supra note 97, at 97.
125.
126.

Id. at 98.
Id. at 302.

127.

Although some sources suggest that the stereotype has faded, see, e.g., Arthur L. Robinson,

U.S. Electronics Needs New Strategy, ScuNcE, June 20, 1986, at 1496, 1497 (referring to Japan's "past
copycat image"), other sources continue to use the same language. See, eg., Japanese Banking:
Mitsubeautiful, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 1991 at 86, 86 (referring to "Japanese copycat banks").

128.

See Chew, supra note 97, at 40.

129.

A similar charge has also been made against whites: "Euro-Americans steal and co-opt vast

portions of African-American culture, usually without attribution." John E. Morrison, Colorblindness,
Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis ofthe Rhetoric AgainstAffirmative Action, 79 IowA L. Ray. 313,

359 (1994).
130. The phrasing, but not the reference to Jews, is drawn from Patricia Williams. See supra text
accompanying note 49.
131. See Wu is, supra note 20, at 39-42 (describing consumer society characterized by "mass
greed" and spiritual emptiness); id at 219 ("We live in a society where the closest equivalent of nobility
is the display of unremittingly controlled willfulness."); Derrick Bell, RacialRealism, 24 CoN. L. REv.
363, 363 (1992) (arguing that American society is irredeemably racist); Delgado, supra note 45, at 1369
(suggesting that Western society has "arrived at a terminus"); Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial
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the cause of these deficiencies in our culture and are themselves deficient
and unappealing.
Like the anti-Semitic beliefs discussed above, blaming Jews for the
evils of mainstream culture has a long historical pedigree. The rise of both
capitalism and communism have been blamed on Jews.' 32 Marx portrayed
capitalism as essentially Jewish' 3 3 and predicted that Jews would disappear
under socialism, which would "abolish the preconditions and thus the very
possibility of huckstering" and would thereby "make the Jew impossible." 134 In the early twentieth century, Germans and Austrians-in countries where anti-Semitism had always flourished and would soon explodelamented the "Judaisation" of German and Austrian culture.13 5 Not surprisingly, given the role of Jews in important cultural institutions such as the
academy and the movie industry, the same charges have been made about
136
American culture.
Attributing societal problems to despised minorities is a common technique. In the nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants were sometimes
accused of threatening to destroy the American working class and its culture.1 37 Blacks have been blamed for causing cultural decay by introducing
1 38
Americans to everything from crime and drugs to family breakdown.
Like the first two explanations of Jewish success, then, this theory portrays
Jews negatively and rests on an analysis common to racist arguments used
against other minorities.
Suggesting that the fundamental "Jewishness" of American culture
explains Jewish success also creates more questions than it answers.
Considering that Jews are less than three percent of the population, how did
Jewish culture become so dominant? Either Jewish culture happened to
have features that were more meritorious than the majority culture or Jews
insidiously remade that culture in their own image. The former explanation
Politics and an Infinity-Based Response: Will Endless Talking Cure America's Racial Ills?, 80 Go.

LJ. 1879, 1879-80 (1992) (arguing that racism is inherent in our culture's norms and basic concepts).
132. WimtcH, supra note 97, at 53 ("Socialists condemned Jews as the embodiment of the
'capitalist spirit' . . . while conservatives pointed to Jews as a source of permanent unrest and
revolutionary subversion in European society."); Todd M. Endelman, Comparative Perspectives on
Modern Anti-Semitism in the West, in HisroRy Am HAT: THE DnmmsioNs oF Atm-SEamsM, supra
note 105, at 95, 105 ("Jews were associated with all the destructive forces of modernizationcapitalism, urbanization, democratization, materialism, socialism.'); see also DnNmRSmTIN, supra note
95, at 49-50 (discussing anti-Semitism in the Populist movement).
133. KARL MARx, On the Jewish Question, in EARLY Wmrnros 1, 35-39 (T.B. Bottomore ed. &

trans., 1963).
134. lId at 34.
135. WlmsrcH, supra note 97, at 61-62; Endelman, supra note 132, at 96.
136. See FoasrER & Epssan,supranote 101, at 111.
137. TAY-Ai, supra note 97, at 103-05.
138. See eg., David Treadwell, Town Troubled by Image as Drug Rehabilitation Haven:
Treatment. Officials Say Influx of Black Inner-City Addicts Is Spoiling Williamsport's Homey Flavor,
L.A. TnmAs, Aug. 9, 1992, at Al; Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division:Behavior Modification
Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE LJ. 719, 742-43 (1992).
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conflicts with the radical constructivists' denial of independent standards of
merit generally and with their embrace of multiculturalism. The latter
explanation collapses back into the conspiracy theory of Jewish success.
A milder version of the "Judaisation" argument is that Jewish (and
Asian) culture simply happens to emphasize many of the values that are
needed in modem society, such as education, initiative, enterprise, and so
on. These groups are thus more likely than some other minorities to play
the game successfully by the white (or Gentile) rules, and are more comfortable doing so. 13 9 Such a proposition does not appear to be necessarily
anti-Semitic, and could conceivably explain the relative success of Jews and
Asian Americans (who presumably also share the same "white" values) as
compared to African Americans, whose cultural values might be more distinctive. 140 This benign explanation is unavailable to radical construetivists, however. To suggest that Jews, like white Gentiles, have a different
and non-oppressive set of values or standards than people of color is
already to concede that standards are not just a way of perpetuating existing
hierarchies. The benign explanation suggests that standards and values are
developed by cultures for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that
they appear to be adaptive to the culture's environment. This anthropological truism is a far cry from the radical constructivist view that standards
primarily serve to perpetuate a particular group's power over other groups.
Stripped of its benign interpretation, the Judaisation argument retains only
anti-Semitic components: to the extent that Jews share the (oppressive and
racist) values of powerful white Gentiles, their "hyper-acceptance" of these
values only makes them even "worse" than other whites.
The final conceivable explanation for Jewish success-that such success is nothing more than a statistical anomaly-is in many ways the most
damaging, because it amounts to a denial that Jews exist as a distinct or
identifiable group. Under this theory, it is no more than random chance that
any three percent of the white American population will disproportionately
exhibit any particular characteristics, from financial success to alcoholism.
If being Jewish is an essentially insignificant trait, then any characteristics
Jews exhibit are the result of random differences among the white population. It is thus misleading to point to "Jewish" success as a phenomenon in
need of explanation.
Like the other theories, besides being implausible,1 41 this purported
explanation is analogous to historical forms of anti-Semitism. As early as
139.
140.

A related theory of merit is explored infra at the beginning of Part III.
In other words, this could arguably be part of the answer to a question we are specifically not

addressing: why some groups have been more successful than others in overcorning discrimination. See
supra text accompanying note 22. We wish to make it clear that we are not endorsing this explanation.
141. Given the large numbers involved, it actually seems incredible statistically that the observed
correlation between Jewishness and success could be purely random. Another possible explanation
might be that the direction of causation is reversed-being successful leads people to claim to be Jewish
(or else millions of Jews who are unsuccessful choose not to identify themselves in the various surveys
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the French Revolution, anti-Semitic Enlightenment thinkers urged the
removal of the pervasive restrictions on Jews with the hope that Judaism
would be eliminated, because Jews' only common identity derived from
their oppressed status: "The Jews were not to be emancipated as a commu-

nity but as individual human beings, the assumption being that, once
oppression was removed, their distinctive group identity would disappear."14 2 To deny that Jews are a culturally distinct group is to ignore over
5,000 years of history, during which Jews kept their identity alive in the
face of persecution, dispersal, and genocide.

It is troubling, but not unprecedented, that one of the pivotal propositions of this branch of critical theory-that merit is constructed to serve the
powerful-has anti-Semitic implications. Critics of the existing order have
often ended up targeting Jews, whether intentionally or not. 14 3 Anti-

Semitism has served as "a convenient way of attacking the existing order
without demanding its total overthrow and without having to offer a com-

prehensive alternative." 1"

Sadly, like some of its radical predecessors

45

through the ages,
radical constructivism is not altogether lacking the
potential to fall into the grips of this, "the longest hatred." 4 6
that demonstrate Jewish success). We don't think this possibility requires extended argument. Finally,
being Jewish might correlate with some other reason for success, such as living in a major city, but it is
hard to believe that these additional factors can be powerful enough to explain more than a little of the
large disparity between the Jewish percentage of the general population and membership in groups such
as professors at "elite" academies.
142. Wisnucw, supra note 97, at xxi; see also id. at 44-45 (noting that Enlightenment thinkers
were anti-Semitic). Compare the view of black nationalists that integration, by fostering complete
assimilation into white society, amounted to."painless genocide." Peller, supra note 33, at 798.
143. In particular, African Americans, who have the greatest reason to be dissatisfied with the
status quo, have often lashed out at Jews. Various studies have found blacks to be more anti-Semitic
than whites. See, e.g., DNNERSTErN, supra note 95, at 209-10; JONATHAN KAUFmAw, BRoKEN
ALLIANCE: Tra TunRtaLn, TnsMS BE-wEEw BLAcICs An JEws rNAmEuCA 273-74 (1988); MART=R
& CLARK,supra note 97, at 40-43; WisrrucH, supra note 97, at 123; Hertzberg, supra note 101, at 52;
see also HAROLD E. QutNLEY & CHAu.Es Y. GLOCK, Arn-SEmrnm IN AMERICA 54-72 (1979) (finding
that "economic anti-Semitism" was higher among blacks than among whites, and that young blacks
were more anti-Semitic than middle-aged blacks); GER-RtmE J. Si.zmicK & STEPHEN STmwNERo, THE
TENAcITY

OF PREJmIcE: ANr-SmasM IN

CoN-aNeopa-Y

AMmCA 117-31

(1969)

(same);

SILBERmAN, supranote 80, at 339 (stating that younger and better-educated blacks are more anti-Semitic
and that black leaders are "the most anti-Semitic of all"). For a graphic description of black antiSemitism, see William G. Ortner, Jews, African-Americans, and the Crown Heights Riots: Applying
Matsuda'sProposalto Restrict Racist Speech, 73 B.U. L. REv. 897, 898-900 (1993). The anti-Semitic
Protocolsof the Elders ofZion seems to have been well received by black Muslims in the 1970s. See,
e.g., BEaT, supra note 95, at 229; FoRsTra & EpsraiN, supra note 101, at 209. Black anti-Semitism
"not only allows them to identify with the white majority but it provides as well a socially acceptable
outgroup on whom they might vent their frustrations." Dmw anEsTrN,
supra note 95, at 223. Current
tensions between African Americans and Jews, two groups that were historically allies, are
disheartening.
144. SHULAmrr VoLKov, Tam RISE Or POPULAR ANrIMODERSM IN GERmANY: Tm URUBAN
MASTER ARTrsANs, 1873-1896, at 317 (1978).
145. See, e.g., MARx, supra note 133, at 3-40; de Man, supra note 123, at 269-71.
146. The quotation is taken from the subtitle of WisnRicH, supra note 97.
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This unsettling possible alignment of radical constructivism with the
worst totalitarian regime of this century should also-upon reflectionseem less than shocking. 147 The core of the radical constructivist paradigm
is a rejection of the Enlightenment and its emphasis on rationality and scientific explanation.14 Instead, radical constructivists seek to explain the
world solely as the result-deliberate or unconscious-of ideology and the
pursuit of dominance. But that standard leaves little room for shared concepts of merit, morality, or anything else.'4 9 As other scholars have noted,
radical constructivism "leaves no ground whatsoever for distinguishing reliable knowledge from superstition."' 50 As a feminist philosopher who sympathizes with what we have called radical constructivism has warned, it can
readily slide into moral relativism 5 '--only one step away from relying on
raw power to determine truth. For if ideas are mere reflections of the exercise of power, it becomes difficult to find a basis for criticizing social
arrangements. And if raw power is the test of truth, totalitarians are merely
the most unabashed constructors of reality. Much as radical constructivists
may dislike this conclusion, its potential is present in their conceptual
apparatus.
Not every criticism of current societal standards is subject to our critique. But the radical constructivist attack on merit seeks to deconstruct
merit into merely a method of group domination. The purpose is beneficent-to explain (and end) the subordinated position of certain minorities.
As postmodemists should be well aware, however, texts do not always limit
themselves to their authors' purposes, nor do ideas. Having deconstructed
merit into pure power, radical constructivists face an implication they will
surely find wholly unpalatable-for if merit is merely group power, then
Jewish success becomes the fruit of Jewish power. That way lies madness.

147. Similar charges have been levelled against deconstructionism, another postmodem doctrine.
See, e.g., Letter (Charles Griswold, Jr.), Deconstruction,The Nazis, andPauldeMan, N.Y. Rav. BooKs,
Oct. 12, 1989, at 69 (deconstructionism "encourages" Nazism); DEBORAH Lr'sTADT, DENYING THE
HOLOCAUST: Tim GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY 17-19 (1993) (deconstructionism makes
Holocaust denial respectable). But see Vivian Crosswald Curran, Deconstructionism, Structuralism,

Antisemitism and the Law 36 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (1994) (defending deconstructionism against these and
other charges).

148. See generally GROSS & LEvrrr, supra note 19. Cf Curran, supra note 147, at 2, 4, 27
(deconstructionism and other modernist movements reject the Enlightenment paradigm).
149.

For an analogous point about deconstruectionist philosophers and literary critics, see Richard

Eldridge, Deconstructionand Its Alternatives, 18 MAN & WORLD 147 (1985).
150.

GROSS & LEvrrr, supra note 19, at 45. It might be more fair to say that radical constructivists

reject the very distinction in question.
151.

Williams, supra note 19, at 87-88. Williams describes several efforts to modify con-

structivism in order to make it fully compatible with feminist values. She seems to view these efforts as
promising but as not yet wholly successful. Id. at 93-104.
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THE MERITS OF "MERIT"
We hope we have shown that the radical constructivist view of merit
as a virtually empty vessel into which the preferences of the powerful have
been poured is untenable because it is inherently anti-Semitic. At this
point, however, some readers may be thinking that we have made things too
easy for ourselves. If not a straw man, radical constructivism is a view that
many will find quite implausible. Perhaps critical theorists could adopt
some more moderate theory about the social construction of merit which
would prove more defensible.
An alternative critical theory might describe current social standards as
"arbitrary" rather than inherently tainted by racism and sexism. Because
certain groups were, for whatever reason, non-participants during the creation of the standard, they tend to be excluded by those standards-unless,
like Jews and some Asian-American groups, the standard simply happens
by chance to correspond to something in their own culture. (Alternatively,
these groups might have mastered the dominant culture as a response to
their subordinated status.) Many readers will find this plausible as a historic description, and we have no quarrel with that reaction. But terms such
as "arbitrary" are not merely descriptive but normative, and the normative
side of this picture remains troubling.
To say that standards of merit are arbitrary is to say, as Duncan
Kennedy says about conflicting paradigms, that no meta-criteria exist for
evaluating them or judging between them. 152 If so, then reason can play no
role in accepting or rejecting these standards, for there are no criteria to
which reason can appeal. But this approach also makes it difficult to criticize the status quo. Critical theorists certainly want to be able to say that it
is unfair for some groups to be excluded arbitrarily from social success, yet
"fairness" seems to function as a "meta-criterion" here, and hence to be
153
illegitimate under the arbitrariness view.
Moreover, the arbitrariness view mutes but does not eliminate potential anti-Semitic implications. Suppose some group--let us say, Gentilescomplains that current standards are providing disproportionate success to
other groups, thereby depriving their own group of its share of desirable
social goods. What responses are available to this complaint under the arbitrariness view? Perhaps the most straightforward response, in the absence
of a fairness criterion, is that no standard is any better or any worse than
any other, so that this disproportionate impact is not an argument against
152. See supra text accompanying note 39.
153. In the specific context of legal scholarship the paradox is more acute, for if fairness is a valid
trans-paradigmatic value, then an argument about law would be more or less sound depending on its
correct application of this value, and this would provide us with a way of measuring merit across
different scholarly paradigms. Hence,judgments about the merits of legal scholarship would be far from
arbitrary.
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current standards. However, there is also no argument available against
changing these standards to reduce the success of Jews or Asian Americans,
since the choice of standards is simply one about which no argument is
possible. We are then back to force as the only arbiter (other than chance),
a standard that can hardly be considered advantageous to minority groups
such as Jews or Asian Americans. Denying that merit plays a role in Jewish
1 54
success inevitably allow that success to be taken away.
On the other hand, perhaps some fairness arguments are to be allowed.
Any such test for fairness can have no relationship to the content of the
standards, since the standards are assumed to be purely arbitrary. Thus,
"fairness" must be completely external to the substance of the standard.
One might judge fairness in procedural terms with respect to historic origin:
a standard is fair if the complaining group had a fair chance to participate in
its adoption. But this right to participation seems to mean little for minority
groups, who will always be outvoted, since by hypothesis they have no
arguments to make giving the majority reasons for adopting a different
standard.
Alternatively, fairness could be defined in terms of outcomes-a standard is fair if and only if all groups achieve roughly proportionate success
under that standard. But this version implies that it is primafacie unfair if
any group, such as Jews or Asian Americans, achieves disproportionate
success. While that disproportionate success may not be unfair in terms of
its historic origins, it still is prospectively unfair, since it favors particular
groups and cannot by hypothesis be justified (since it is purely arbitrary).
Hence, anti-Semitic and racist strategies, such as quotas against Jews or
Asian Americans, are an appropriate way of more fairly allocating social
resources. In the end, we believe that disproportionate success cannot be
accepted unless it is justifiable, and such a justification must invoke notions
of merit. Viewing merit (at the level of intergroup comparisons, at least) as
being arbitrary deprives successful minority groups of any way to defend
their attainments.
Although the arbitrariness view is fairly frequently expressed, we
doubt that it is very seriously intended. For instance, consider such standards for judging scholarship as the following: that factual assertions be
documented, that arguments proceed logically, that sources be fairly interpreted, that normative claims be plausibly based. Does anyone really think
that these are simply arbitrary standards, which could equally well have
been abandoned for their opposites? We think not. Any serious claim has
to accept these standards at some level, while possibly subjecting them to
criticism. Such criticism might take the form of saying that the interpreta154. Glenn Loury makes a similar argument, noting that attacks on merit can be seen as analogous
to attacks on affirmative action in that both constitute an assault on the "livelihood and security" of
particular groups. GLENN C. LouRY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS ON
RACE AND REsPoNsmILy iN AMEmCA 86 (1995).
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tion of the standards has been distorted by social factors such as racism or
sexism, or that the standards need to be augmented with others, but these
criticisms themselves must rely on reason in a way that precludes postulating the inherent arbitrariness of standards.
Such a critical view of standards would still leave open the possibility
of arguing that particular distortions in the standards have disadvantaged
particular groups. When standards were created with the complete exclusion of some groups, it is not implausible that such a showing might be
made, and criticisms of particular standards must be given a serious hearing. But because there is no presumption that the standards are invalid,
arbitrary, or tainted, groups can rely on the standards to justify their success
except where there is some particular argument to the contrary. In particular, minority groups such as Jews and some Asian Americans would be
entitled to maintain that their successes were meritorious, until such time as
someone is able to point to some specific way in which standards are
improperly biased on their behalf.
It is not our purpose to offer our own theory of merit in place of radical
constructivism. We are not, however, arguing that the current societal concept of merit is objectively valid in all respects, or that it is unaffected by
social problems such as racism and sexism. There are other alternatives to
radical constructivism besides a complacent endorsement of the status quo.
One alternative is the revision of current merit standards within the
objectivist paradigm. Even for those who believe that completely objective,
timeless standards of merit do exist, there can be no guarantee that we have
reached a final understanding of those standards. An objective standard can
be distorted by the limited vision of those in power. Moreover, our understanding of merit can change over time, and certainly has done so. Little
more than one hundred years ago a law professor was a practicing lawyer
who wrote comprehensive but unimaginative treatises and conducted himself like a gentleman. 155 Although the core concepts of teaching and scholarship have survived, there has been an evolution in the translation of these
concepts into operation. That evolution probably has not reached its end;
one hundred years from now our own standards of merit may seem equally
in need of revision. Thus, even given a view of merit as essentially objective, one need not leap to an unqualified endorsement of current definitions.
We need to be willing to expand those definitions to include the innovative
and unfamiliar.

155. See Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An HistoricalPerspective,54 'VA. L. Rav.
689, 709 (1968) (stating that law professors' lectures resembled treatises); see generally ROBERT
STEvENs, LAW ScHooL: LErAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO

=a 1980s, at 38 (1983)

(describing the origins of the division between legal academics and practitioners); Charles R. McManis,
The History of First Century American Legal Education:A RevisionistPerspective, 59 WASH. U. L.Q.
597 (1981) (tracing historical changes in American legal education).
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Objectivism is not the only option for those who reject radical constructivism: pragmatism is another alternative. In contrast to critical theorists, pragmatists are willing to give existing standards the benefit of the
doubt. Pragmatism values tradition as "the essential foundation for intellectual and social progress."' 5 6 Consequently, traditions and standards deserve
what James Boyd White calls presumptive authority.' 5 7 This prudent
regard for tradition can favor incremental over radical change, 58 but it
neither reifies tradition nor denies the importance of experimentation.
Pragmatism thus seeks a balance between "the 'funded knowledge' of past
159
experience [and] the open possibilities offered by future experience."
The pragmatist presumption in favor of existing standards also resonates
with the tenets of civic republicanism. A community, whether of citizens or
of scholars, is held together by its allegiance to both the past and the
future.' 60
For present purposes, the philosophical differences between the objectivist and pragmatist views of merit need not concern us. Under either one,
we should be receptive to but critical of challenges to current conceptions
of merit. Contemporary standards should receive a rebuttable presumption
of validity, and the burden ought to be on challengers to show why particular aspects of those standards ought to be eliminated, amended, or
expanded.'6' In the academic context, any changes must be justified
according to the overriding purposes of scholarship: to pursue truth and to
expand the boundaries of human knowledge. The intellectual community
as a whole must be open to such challenges but must "exercise due care and
must make [its] assessment on scholarly grounds."' 62 Only then can we

avoid the twin perils of an unthinking adherence to tradition and an unreflective overeagerness for change.
CONCLUSION

We hope that those critical theorists who have embraced radical constructivism will take this essay as both constructive criticism and an invita156.
(1988).
157.

Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MDM. L. REv. 1331, 1344
James B. White, Introduction:Is CulturalCriticism Possible?, 84 MxcH.L. Rzv. 1373, 1382

(1986).
158. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE
LJ. 1567, 1602-10 (1985).
159. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatismfor the 21st Century, U. IL. L.
REv. (forthcoming 1994).
160. See generally Farber, supra note 159, at 35-37; Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism:

Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 131, 162-65 (1995).
161. For a similar argument that proponents of adding new disciplines to the university have the
burden of justification, see Judith J. Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Selection, in FREEDom Am
TENuRE
'N TmE AcADEMY 155, 157-65 (William W. Van Alstyne ed., 1993).

162. Id. at 163. In particular, Thomson contends that judging the validity of an idea on the basis of
its author's race or gender would violate this principle. Id. at 162.
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tion. It is meant to caution them about the unintended implications of their
theory of merit, and to invite them to join rather than to abandon a dialogue
merit,
about the proper definition and application of societal standards of 63
standards.'
those
distorted
have
may
sexism
and of how racism and
The appropriate response to the proposition that different cultures (and
different eras) have different standards of merit is to enter into a broadranging inquiry about which standards are most defensible for our own
society: in other words, to discuss what should count as merit and why.'6
It is that discussion we are inviting radical constructivists to join. Our reading of their scholarship is that they have so far eschewed such a discussion
as essentially meaningless. 165 Thus, they are perilously close to reducing
decisions about merit to sheer exercises of power.
66
In the best tradition of critical theory, we close with a story.'
Whether or not this story clarifies our ideas, it may at least help explain
why we felt impelled to write about this unpleasant topic, and why we are
particularly concerned about the implications of subordinating merit to
power. This story took place at a labor camp called Plaszow. A prisoner,
an architectural engineer named Diana Reiter, argued that the foundation of
a new barracks needed to be torn out and replaced. The new commander of
the camp considered it a "first principle that you never listened to a Jewish
specialist," so he ordered her shot on the spot. "[T]he shooting of this
Diana Reiter, the cancelling of her Western European diploma, had this
practical value.., that if Miss Diana Reiter could not save herself with all
her professional skill, the only chance of the others was prompt and anonymous labor."16 7 In hell, it seems, all reality is socially constructed, and
merit does not exist.

163. Of all the misreadings of this essay that we would like to avoid, one of the worst would be that
we view minority problems as "their own fault." We do adopt a presumption in favor of societal
standards of merit, and this does at least present the possibility that elements of some subcultures are
less conducive to achievement. But this presumption does not blind us from recognizing the reality of
widespread discrimination.
164. For a brief example of how to conduct such an intercultural comparison, see THOMAS SOWELL,
RACE AND CuLTtRu: A WORLD Viw 5 (1994) (why "Arabic" numerals, actually invented in India, are
better than Roman numerals, invented by Europeans).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 40-66. This reading is also supported by the
unwillingness of some radical constructivists to propose or describe any standards of merit of their own.
See Richard Delgado, Legal Scholarship:Insiders, Outsiders,Editors,63 U. COLO. L. Rav. 717, 722-23
(1992) (rejecting call for standards for evaluating the scholarship of critical race theorists).
166. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALw. L. RE. 971 (1991);
Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87 MICH. L. Rav.

2411 (1989).
167.

THOMAS KENEALLY, ScaNDLE's Lisr 167-69 (1982).
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